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The Bullionist Controversy in the United Kingdom is one of the ﬁrst debates about the determina-
tion of the price level and the exchange rate under a paper money standard. Despite the importance
of the debate in the development of monetary theory, there remains little empirical evidence that uses
modern, multivariate time series techniques. The evidence that does exist provides support for the
Anti-Bullionist position. The purpose of this paper is to review the debate and develop a dynamic
general equilibrium model that is capable of capturing key features of the 19th-century British ﬁnan-
cial system. The model is estimated using Bayesian procedures to test the competing hypotheses. The
paper provides support for the Bullionist position.
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1 Introduction
From 1792 - 1815, the United Kingdom was involved in perpetual military conﬂict with France during the
French Revolutionary Wars and the Napoleonic Wars. A few years after the start of the conﬂict, in 1795
and 1796, signiﬁcant increases in military and political expenditures reduced the specie held in reserve
at the Bank of England. Around the same time, poor harvests resulted in additional specie outﬂow due
to the eﬀect on the balance of trade. Finally, at the beginning of 1797, reports of a French invasion of
Wales led to a run on banks. As a result of the drain of reserves at the Bank of England, in February
1797, the British government issued an order that suspended convertibility at the Bank. The suspension
was meant to be temporary, but it lasted until 1821. This period from 1797 to 1821 is known as the Bank
Restriction Period.
During the Bank Restriction Period, a paper money standard replaced the British gold standard. The
suspension of convertibility also created a ﬂoating exchange rate regime. From the time of suspension
until 1801, the price level increased by 50 percent. After a signiﬁcant decline in the price level from
1801 to 1803, the price level increased uninterrupted until 1813. When the British government restored
convertibility in 1821, the price level had already returned to the pre-Restriction level. The signiﬁcant
ﬂuctuations in the price level resulted in considerable debate about the determination of the price level
and the exchange rate under a paper money standard. These debates are known as the Bullionist
Controversy.1
Participants in the debate did not have data on the price level. This not only complicated the debate,
but is also the source of the debate’s name.2 The two parties to the debate, the Bullionists and Anti-
Bullionists, were given their names as a result of their views on whether the paper price of the gold
bullion accurately reﬂected a depreciation of the value of the currency. The Bullionists argued that rising
prices were the result of an excessive issuance of bank notes on the part of the Bank of England. The
1One could think of the Bullionist Controversy as describing multiple debates occurring at once. For example, the debate
about the deviation of the market price of gold from the mint price can, at times, be seen as distinct from issues involving the
determination of the price level and the exchange rate. Other times, the discussion of the premium on the market price of gold
serves as a proxy for the price level. This paper is primarily concerned with discussing the determination of the price level and
the exchange rate under a paper money standard. In a recent paper, Antipa (2014) analyzes the premium of the market price
of gold over the mint price, the “agio”. In particular, he tests for structural breaks in the agio series and ﬁnds that they line up
with signiﬁcant events. Antipa argues that this is consistent with the ﬁscal theory of the price level. It is the view of this author
that this work is complementary to the present analysis, especially given the fact that the present analysis ﬁnds evidence that
the Bank of England eﬀectively monetized some portion of government debt.
2Viner (1937: 126) notes: “The notion of an index number was still in its infancy. Evelyn had published his crude index
number of English prices for the preceding two centuries in 1798 . . . But no current index number yet existed for England, and
there was but little information as to the prices prevailing in other countries.”
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early Anti-Bullionists countered that the rising price level was the result of shocks to the balance of trade
due to large foreign remittances by the British government and poor harvests.
Despite the signiﬁcance of these debates, there is very little empirical evidence for this time period.
Much of the existing empirical evidence available was done by the participants in the debate and by
economists in the early to mid-20th century.3 More recently Nachane and Hatekar (1995) and Oﬃcer
(2000) have revisited the Bullionist controversy using available data and modern multivariate time series
analysis. These authors argue that the evidence favors the position of the Anti-Bullionists. Empirical
evidence in support of the Bullionist position appears mixed, at best.
The Bank Restriction Period appears to follow a quintessentially monetarist story. The British gov-
ernment suspended the convertibility of bank notes into gold at the Bank of England in the midst of war
and the price level rose substantially over the next decade and a half. Meanwhile, the French maintained
their bimetallic standard without any evidence of a depreciation in the franc.4 A natural hypothesis is
that the British government used its political power in conjunction with the suspension of convertibility
to obtain credit from the Bank of England, thereby eﬀectively monetizing some portion of its debt. The
failure of previous research to identify evidence in support of the standard monetarist position put forth
by the Bullionists is therefore of some signiﬁcance.
The purpose of this paper is to re-examine the conclusions of existing empirical work using modern
macroeconomic theory as a guide. In particular, this paper develops an open economy monetary search
model that captures some important characteristics of the 19th-century British ﬁnancial system.5 The
model is then estimated using Bayesian procedures. The posterior estimates of the model parameters
are then used to perform impulse response analysis. The importance of estimating impulse responses
in this way is that the structural assumptions are consistent with the model and are therefore explicit.
The estimates show that shocks to the supply of bank notes have a positive eﬀect on the price level. In
addition, the estimates provide evidence that some portion of the debt incurred by the British government
was ﬁnanced through the creation of bank notes by the Bank of England.
An important question is why the results diﬀer from those of previous researchers. First, this paper
3For the empirical analysis of contemporaries, see Ricardo (1810-11) and Galton (1813). The analysis by economists of a later
period, see Silbering (1923, 1924a, 1924b), Angell (1926), Viner (1937), and Gayer, Rostow, and Schwartz (1953).
4As Bordo and White (1991) point out, France’s decision to remain on a bimetallic standard was the result of the French
government’s poor reputation in debt ﬁnance in the aftermath of the French Revolution.
5The model is a modiﬁcation and extension of the monetary search model of Lagos and Wright (2005). Unlike conventional
search models, there is spatial separation that creates the need for settlement as in Freeman (1996a, 1996b, 1999). For an
overview of monetary search models and an application to settlement, see Nosal and Rocheteau (2011).
3
shows that the failure of previous researchers to identify cointegration between the logs of the supply of
bank notes and the price level is because these variables do not have a unit root, but rather experience a
change in the time trend following the Bank of England’s voluntary resumption of bank note convertibility.
Second, the model is used to simulate data. This enables one to conduct Granger causality tests when
the true data generating process is known. The inability to ﬁnd evidence that the supply of bank notes
“Granger cause” the price level is evident in both the simulated data and the real world data. Thus, it
seems that the absence of Granger causation should not be interpreted as support for the Anti-Bullionist
position, but rather as an inadequate test.
The paper therefore provides the ﬁrst evidence in support of the Bullionist position using modern
empirical techniques.
2 The Bullionist Controversy
2.1 An Overview of the Financial System in the 19th Century United Kingdom
The nineteenth-century United Kingdom had a rather sophisticated ﬁnancial system. The banking system
consisted of the Bank of England and various country banks. Each bank’s liabilities consisted of privately
issued bank notes that circulated alongside large denomination gold coins and small denomination silver
coins.6 Deposits were also used, but did not make up a large fraction of the money supply.
Credit was often bilateral, with bills of exchange a primary form of credit between ﬁrms. The
following example illustrates the way in which bills of exchange functioned. Suppose that a merchant
received goods from a producer or wholesaler. Instead of a cash payment, the producer would draw a
bill of exchange on the merchant for the amount of the goods due at a short period in the future.7 A
merchant who accepted the bill agreed to settle the debt at the speciﬁed date in the future. Thus, upon
acceptance, the bill of exchange represented an IOU from the merchant to the producer.
Bills of exchange diﬀered from traditional bank loans in many ways. First, bills matured at the end of
a short time interval. Second, bills represented a multilateral commitment by the acceptor. For example,
in the case of a bank loan, the borrower engages in a bilateral commitment. The borrower agrees to pay
back the loan to the bank. While bills of exchange were also forms of bilateral credit, bills represented
6Only underweight silver coins circulated (Viner, 1937).
7Sight bills could also be drawn, which were due at the time of issuance.
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multilateral commitments. This is because a bill was redeemable at maturity by the bill-holder. This was
true regardless of whether the bill-holder was the creditor who had originally drawn the bill.
The multilateral commitment implies that bills of exchange were negotiable. As a result, an initial
bill-holder could reuse the bill of exchange. As Thornton (1802 [1807]: 31 - 2) details, a current bill-holder
could endorse the bill and use it as a form of payment. In addition, in the event that the acceptor of the
bill defaulted, the bill-holder could seek recourse with those who had previously endorsed the bill (Capie
and Webber, 1985: 311-2).
The negotiability of bills of exchange also had important implications for banking. The discounting
of bills was the primary form of bank lending. Speciﬁcally, a bill-holder could take the bill of exchange
to the bank for sale. Banks would issue a liability in the form of new bank notes to purchase bills of
exchange at a discounted price. The banks then presented the bills for collection at maturity, receiving
the spread between the face value of the bill and the discounted price as proﬁt.
Within this context, the Bank of England was the largest and most important bank. In particular,
the Bank of England, located in London, had no competition from other banks in the surrounding area.
Before 1797 and after 1821, the Bank of England’s notes were convertible to specie. The bank notes issued
by country banks were redeemable in specie, but also in notes issued by the Bank of England. In this
way, country banks had a dual reserve system, holding both specie and Bank of England notes in reserve.
During the Bank Restriction Period, Bank of England notes became the dominant form of reserves in
the banking system. This was true despite the fact that convertibility was not suspended for the country
banks.
2.2 The Debate
In 1793, the United Kingdom went to war with France. In the years that followed, the British economy
was subject to considerable ﬁnancial strain due to the increased spending on military and other foreign
expenditures. In 1795 and 1796, bad harvests caused a sharp rise in imports in the U.K. The combination
of these factors caused a considerable drain of gold reserves from the Bank of England. As a result, in
February of 1797, the British government issued an order that suspended convertibility of bank notes at
the Bank of England. The suspension lasted until 1821.
Figure 1 plots the price level for the Bank Restriction Period. As shown in Figure 1, the U.K. expe-
rienced a sharp increase in the price level that continued until 1801. After a brief period of price level
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stability, the price level began to rise again in 1803. The increase continued until the second quarter
of 1813 when military conﬂict with the French ended. After a decline in the price level, a resumption
of inﬂation began after Napoleon’s return in 1815. This increase lasted until the fourth quarter of 1818.
In January of 1817, the Bank of England “began partial resumption at the old par, giving gold upon
demand for certain categories of its notes, under the authority of a provision in the Restriction Act of
1797 permitting the banks to pay notes under £5 in cash” (Viner, 1937: 172). The British government
restored convertibility in 1821, at which point the price level had already returned to its pre-restriction
level.
The source of the persistent increases in prices over this period was subject to considerable debate.8
Data on the price level did not exist at the time. As a result, the participants in the debate often refer
to the diﬀerences between prices listed in terms of gold coins and prices listed in terms of paper bank
notes as a measure of the depreciation of the currency. Others used foreign exchange rates, the price of
bullion in terms of the paper pound, as well as other indicators of general increases in prices.
The debate consisted of two groups, the Bullionists and the Anti-Bullionists. The Bullionists argued
that the increase in prices and the depreciation of the exchange rate was due to excess issuance of
bank notes on the part of the Bank of England. Anti-Bullionists argued that ﬂuctuations in prices and
the exchange rate were due to remittances and subsidies paid by the British government. They also
attributed changes to bad luck as a result of poor British harvests. In other words, Bullionists argued
that ﬂuctuations in the price level were due to shocks to the money supply whereas the Anti-Bullionists
argued that ﬂuctuations in the price level were the result of shocks to the balance of trade and supply
shocks.
The evolving nature of the debate can be understood quite well by considering the views of Henry
Thornton. In 1802, Thornton published An Inquiry into the Nature and Eﬀects of Paper Credit in Great
Britain. The book outlined a much more nuanced and comprehensive view of the Bullionist position
than those given by Thornton’s contemporaries. In addition, while his book outlined what would be
considered a Bullionist argument, he also suggested that the Bank of England did not bear signiﬁcant
blame for the rise in the price level in the early stages of the Bank Restriction Period.
Later, as a member of the Bullion Committee, Thornton wrote, together with Francis Horner, the
8This debate has been summarized in great detail elsewhere. As such, what follows is a brief overview. For comprehensive
overviews of the controversy, see Angell (1926) and Viner (1937).
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Report of the Bullion Committee (1810). The report was very critical of the Bank of England and, in
large part, relied on the principles set forth in Thornton (1802) to make these arguments. As a result, a
thorough understanding of Thornton’s views and the reason for his change in assessment of the blame
help one to better understand the subtleties of the Bullionist Controversy.
2.3 Thornton and the Subtleties of the Debate
Thornton’s Paper Credit outlines the Bullionist position in detail and presents a rather sophisticated view
of the quantity theory. However, it also highlights some subtle points that help one to better understand
the Bullionist position.
Paper Credit is notable, in part, for points that Thornton, unlike some other Bullionists, was willing to
concede to the Anti-Bullionists. For example, Thornton (1802 [1807]: 168 - 70) readily acknowledged the
validity of the arguments made by Anti-Bullionists regarding the eﬀects of poor harvests and government
remittances on the exchange rate. Nonetheless, in Thornton’s view, shocks to the balance of trade could
inﬂuence the price level or the exchange rate, but the dominant factor were shocks to the quantity of bank
notes. Thornton (1802 [1807]: 167) explained the Bullionist position for explaining the rising price level
in terms that would be familiar with a modern understanding of the quantity theory of money. Thornton
(1802 [1807]: 186 - 7) also anticipated modern critiques of the quantity theory. Speciﬁcally, Thornton
clariﬁes that if the demand for money is constant, the only factor that can eﬀect the value of the Bank’s
notes is the supply. In other words, Thornton’s discussion makes clear that while changes in the demand
for money can have an eﬀect on the supply of bank notes in circulation and/or the purchasing power of
those notes, an excess issuance of bank notes will always cause an increase in prices. This is perhaps the
clearest statement of the Bullionist position.
To conclude that this is all Thornton had to oﬀer in terms of economic analysis would do a disservice
to his work.9 Thornton’s views represent a rather sophisticated view of the determination of the supply of
bank notes issued by the Bank of England. For example, throughout much of the debate, Anti-Bullionists
9Thornton’s contributions to monetary economics are perhaps now well-known. It seems that for some time, Thornton was
neglected in this debate. Niehans (1990: 110) notes that Thornton was “an authority during his lifetime, [but] he thus fell into
near oblivion after his death.” As Laidler (2000) notes, this is likely due to a confusion about whether Thornton’s ideas were
his own or instead represented ideas held by or developed by his brother, who was a governor of the Bank of England. Early
scholars apparently viewed Thornton’s work as something of an insiders account and it was discounted (unfairly), accordingly.
His contribution was revived to some degree by Viner (1937) and later by Hayek (1939). Subsequent economists have emphasized
the importance of Thornton’s contributions to economics. See, for example, Schwartz (1981), Humphrey (1986), Skaggs (1995),
and Laidler (2000).
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largely took for granted the view that the Bank of England’s supply of bank notes responded positively
to supply shocks and shocks to the balance of trade to accomodate an increase in the demand for bank
notes. The Anti-Bullionist view was that shocks to military expenditures, foreign subsidies, and poor
harvests caused the exchange rate to depreciate and the price level to rise and the supply of bank notes
to rise. Thornton argued that whether this would indeed occur depended on the Bank’s credit policy.
He also argued that the Bank could prevent such increases in the price level by restricting the supply of
bank notes in response to these shocks.
Thornton’s view is important because it represents an understanding of what modern economists
would call the Bank of England’s reaction function. Thornton (1802 [1807]: 248-9) outlined his view of
the operations of the Bank of England as follows:
To limit the total amount of paper issued, and to resort for this purpose, whenever the
temptation to borrow is strong, to some eﬀectual principle of restriction; in no case, however,
materially to diminish the sum in circulation, but to let it vibrate only within certain limits;
to aﬀord a slow and cautious extension of it, as the general trade of the kingdom enlarges
itself; to allow of some special, though temporary, encrease in the event of any extraordinary
alarm or diﬃculty, as the best means of preventing a great demand at home for guineas;
and to lean to the side of diminution, in the case of gold going abroad, and of the general
exchanges continuing long unfavourable; this seems to be the true policy of the directors of
an institution circumstanced like that of the Bank of England.
This quote illustrates Thornton’s view of the role played by the Bank of England. Nonetheless, previous
scholars seem to have interpreted this as a normative statement about what the Bank of England should
do (Laidler, 2000). While it is true given the context of Thornton’s entire argument that he advocated this
type of policy, the quote above is meant to be a positive description of how the Bank actually operated.
To illustrate this point, consider that just a page earlier, Thornton (1802 [1807]: 247-8) writes:
The preceding observations explain the reason of a determination, adopted some time since
by the bank directors, to limit the total weekly amount of loans furnished by them to the
merchants. The adoption of a regulation for this purpose seems to have been rendered
necessary by that impossibility of otherwise suﬃciently limiting, at all times, the Bank of
England paper, which it has been the design of this Chapter to point out.
The issue of whether to interpret Thornton’s statement as a positive or normative argument is important.
For example, within the literature it is claimed that Thornton’s book “is hard to classify, because though
its analytic content places it ﬁrmly in the Bullionist camp, it nevertheless defends the policies pursued
by the Bank of England after 1797” (Laidler, 2000: 8). Laidler’s view that Thornton’s book is hard to
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classify seems to imply a contradiction. The Bullionist position was that excess issuance on the part of
the Bank of England caused the increase in the price level. A defense of the Bank would seem to support
the Anti-Bullionist view. But there is no contradiction. Thornton’s defense of the Bank of England in the
early part of the Bank Restriction Period is a positive, not normative, analysis. For example, Thornton
believed that changes in the price level could result from either a shock to the money supply or other
shocks emphasized by the Anti-Bullionists. However, Thornton’s view was that the importance of the
shock depended on what economists would now call the Bank of England’s reaction function. He didn’t
believe that remittances or adverse harvests would necessarily result in a change in prices, arguing that
the eﬀects of such shocks on the price level would depend on the central bank’s response (Thornton,
1802 [1807]: 254).
Thornton’s defense of the Bank of England in the early part of the debate amounts to little more
than an implicit acknowledgement that the Bank responded diﬀerently to supply shocks than demand
shocks. There is some indication that Thornton found this desirable. Elsewhere in the text, when
discussing the role of the Bank of England under a gold standard, Thornton (1802 [1807]: 66-8) suggests
that proportional reductions in the supply of bank notes in response to shocks to the balance of trade
and the gold reserve would have adverse consequences on real economic activity if the shocks were
temporary.10 Nonetheless, when discussing the causes of the recent increase in prices, Thornton refrains
from normative statements.
Perhaps further evidence that this defense of the Bank of England was strictly positive rather than
normative is the fact that the defense was short-lived. As noted above, in 1809, a speculative boom and
rising prices caused more consternation about the extent to which these were caused by the Bank of
England. In 1810, the House of Commons formed a committee to studying rising price of bullion. The
outcome of this report is the Bullion Report, which was largely written by Henry Thornton and Francis
Horner. The Report places the blame on the Bank of England for the rising prices over the previous
decade using arguments set forth in Thornton (1802) and described above. This latter characteristic is
important because the Report is considered the deﬁning document of the Bullionist position.
In assessing the Bullionist debate, it is the position of this paper that Thornton represents the most
clear and coherent participant on either side of the debate.11 The discussion of existing empirical work
10This is a point that Thornton’s contemporaries, such as David Ricardo, either didn’t accept or didn’t understand.
11It is traditional in the literature on the Bullionist Controversy to heap praise on Thornton while similarly decrying the lack
of clarity in his book (c.f. Laider, 2010). This author does not share the latter part of that judgment.
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below and the theory and empirical work in this paper will be considered predominantly in light of this
position.
2.4 Existing Empirical Evidence
Much of the existing empirical literature on the Bullionist Controversy predates modern multivariate time
series analysis. This literature is not summarized here both because much of this literature consists of
subjective interpretations of charts and tabular data and because it is summarized adequately elsewhere
(Oﬃcer, 2008). The focus of this section is on the two papers that use modern empirical techniques.
The earliest attempt to use modern time series techniques to address the Bullionist Controversy was
Nachane and Hatekar (1995). They use annual data from 1802 - 1838 on the price of gold, the exchange
rate of sterling in Paris, a wholesale price index, the trade balance, and a measure of the money supply
to examine the positions of the Bullionists and Anti-Bullionists. They measure the money supply as the
ratio of the supply of bank notes and deposits to real output. The authors perform unit root tests for each
of the variables. They fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for each of the variables, except for
the trade balance. They then use bivariate cointegration tests for each combination of variables. They
only ﬁnd evidence of one cointegrating relationship, which is between the logs of wholesale prices and
the ratio of money to real output.12
In addition, they use Granger causality tests to determine whether lags of a given variable have an
eﬀect on a particular variable of interest. They perform these tests using each of the variables listed
above as dependent variables. They ﬁnd Granger causality in only two cases. Their results show that the
trade balance Granger-causes the wholesale price index and that the exchange rate Granger-causes the
wholesale price index. Each of these results is consistent with the Anti-Bullionist position. None of the
results are consistent with the Bullionist position. Thus, Nachane and Hatekar (2005) conclude that their
evidence strongly favors the Anti-Bullionist position.
There is reason for caution about these results. To the extent that the conclusions of each side of
the debate were conditional on a monetary regime in which bank notes were inconvertible, it seems
necessary to limit the scope of the empirical evidence to the Bank Restriction period. The use of annual
data limits the authors in this respect and so they add data at the end of the sample. Also, the authors
12Curiously, they do not interpret this as evidence in favor of the Bullionist position, despite being consistent with Thornton’s
views above.
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fail to ﬁnd evidence of cointegration between all but two combinations of variables. This is problematic
because one of the variables in this cointegrated relationship, the wholesale price index produced by
Silberling (1924), is ﬂawed (Gayer, Rostow, Schwartz, 1953: 463-7). In addition, the lack of cointegration
might reﬂect a lack of a long-run equilibrium relationship between the variables or, alternatively the
authors might have incorrectly concluded that the variables follow unit root processes. As there is so
little evidence of cointegration, there is at least some reason to suspect that the latter might be true. The
empirical work below considers this possibility.
Subsequent work by Oﬃcer (2000) is an improvement over Nachane and Hatekar (1995) for two
reasons. First, Oﬃcer uses quarterly rather than annual data. This not only allows for greater degrees
of freedom, but also allows him to limit his analysis to the Bank Restriction Period. Second, Oﬃcer uses
the quarterly average of the price index developed by Gayer, Rostow, and Schwartz (1953). This index
corrects for the shortcomings of Silberling’s index.
Oﬃcer examines the positions of the Bullionists and Anti-Bullionists using Granger causality tests
and a structural vector autoregresssion (VAR) model. His model includes the supply of bank notes, the
price of wheat, the price level, military expenditures, and the exchange rate. Oﬃcer’s Granger causality
tests show that the supply of bank notes Granger causes both the price level and the exchange rate.
There is also evidence that the price level and the price of wheat predict the supply of bank notes.
Oﬃcer interprets this as mixed evidence since there seems to be causation running both ways between
the price level and the supply of bank notes.13
Oﬃcer then estimates a structural VAR model using a Choleski decomposition to identify the eco-
nomic shocks. Oﬃcer determines the orderings of the variables using the results of the Granger causality
tests. After recovering the structural shocks, he then estimates the impulse response functions of each of
the variables in response to each of the shocks. The impulse response functions show that the response
of the price level to a shock to the supply of bank notes is not statistically signiﬁcant for any point after
the shock. In fact, the only shock that has a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the price level is the shock
to the price of wheat, which he views as a supply shock. Variance decompositions similarly cast doubt on
the Bullionist position. Thus, Oﬃcer concludes that there is more support for the Anti-Bullionist position
than for the Bullionist position.
13One should note here, as Oﬃcer himself does, that Granger causality is not necessarily economic causality. A point which
is revisited below.
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Nonetheless, there is reason for skepticism about Oﬃcer’s results. Speciﬁcally, Granger causality
tests depend critically on the nature and the role of policy. This is a case in which the Bullionist
position described by Thornton is particularly important. If the Bank of England responded diﬀerently
to demand-side shocks than supply-side shocks to the economy, then one would expect to ﬁnd instances
when the money supply lagged the price level as well as periods in which the money supply led the
price level. Nonetheless, since the Granger causality tests are conducted for the entire sample, the test
is averaging across these eﬀects. In addition, if the Bank of England’s credit policy was a function of
the advances that they gave to the government, this would create a correlation between monetary and
ﬁscal policy that would be hard to disentangle using Granger causality tests. These two criticisms suggest
that Granger causality tests are potentially uninformative about the role of excess bank note issuance in
explaining the price level.
In addition, Oﬃcer uses a Choleski decomposition to identify the model’s structural shocks. This is
potentially problematic because a Choleski decomposition requires assumptions about the contempora-
neous relationships between the variables that is dependent on ordering. Given that the ordering can be
arbitrary, Oﬃcer uses the results of his Granger causality tests to determine the ordering of the variables.
Granger causality tests might not be useful for this purpose. They test the eﬀects of a lagged variable on
a variable of interest. These tests do not provide information about the contemporaneous relationships
between the variables. Thus, it is possible that the structural shocks have not been properly identiﬁed.
With these criticisms in mind, the remainder of the paper develops an explicit theoretical model
capable of replicating key characteristics of the British ﬁnancial system described above. One can estimate
the model directly to determine the eﬀects of shocks to the supply of bank notes and to real government
spending. The beneﬁt of this approach is that the structural assumptions are explicitly known. Also, one
can use the model to simulate data and construct Granger causality tests. One can then assess whether
the existing evidence on Granger causality is informative toward understanding the source of ﬂuctuations
in the price level.
3 The Model
There are two countries, a home country and a foreign country. The countries are identical. The
description below describes the home country, but is equally applicable to the foreign country. Time is
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discrete and continues forever. Each time period is divided into three subperiods. For simplicity and
ease of exposition, these time periods will be referred to as morning, afternoon, and night.14 Agents are
spatially separated across I diﬀerent islands, where I is an even number. The islands are arranged in
a circle around a central location. Each island has a neighboring island, but is separate from all other
islands. Let i ∈ {1, 3, 5, . . . , I − 1} be an index of odd numbered islands and j ∈ {2, 4, 6, . . . , I} be
an index of even-numbered islands. The islands are numbered sequentially such that Island 1 is next to
Island 2, Island 3 is next to Island 4, and so on. There are N agents on each odd-numbered island and
each even-numbered island. The population on each island is assumed to be constant. A visualization
of the environment is shown in Figure 2.
On all odd-numbered islands, agents produce a good that is unique to their island. Let y(i) denote
the quantity of the odd-island good produced by an agent on island i. Agents on odd-numbered islands
use labor, h, to produce y. It is assumed that the production function is given as y(i) = h(i) and
that agents on odd-numbered islands can only produce at night. The odd-island good is assumed to be
non-storable, even across subperiods. Henceforth, all agents on odd-numbered islands will be referred
to as debtors, which foreshadows their role in the model.
On even-numbered islands, agents also produce a good that is unique to their island. Let q(j)
denote the quantity produced by agents on even-numbered island j. Let f [q(j)] denote the cost of
producing q for those on even-numbered islands, measured in terms of disutility. Agents on even-
numbered islands only produce in the morning. The even-island good is also non-storable, even across
subperiods. Henceforth, all agents on even-numbered islands are referred to as creditors, which again
foreshadows their role in the model.
In addition to producing diﬀerent goods with diﬀerent production technologies, agents on odd- and
even-numbered islands also diﬀer in terms of consumption preferences. Debtors want to consume the
good on their neighboring even-numbered island and creditors want to consume the good produced on





14The use of morning, afternoon, and night should not be taken literally. In fact, given the nature of bills of exchange, a
more reasonable interpretation given the setup of the model would be that each period t is a quarter of one year, such that
each subperiod represents a month’s time.
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where % denotes the quantity of the creditor good that is consumed by the debtor, −ht(i) is the disutility
of labor, u is the utility from consuming %, and u′,−u′′ > 0, u′(0) = ∞, u′(∞) = 0. Given the linear





There are two types of creditors of equal size on each even-numbered island. The ﬁrst group
of creditors has deterministic preferences. Speciﬁcally, it is assumed that creditors on island j with
deterministic preferences visit island j ⊕ 1 = j + 1 mod I to consume good y. The expected lifetime






cCDt (j)− f [qCDt (j)]
}
(2)
where qCDt is the quantity produced by creditors with deterministic preferences and c
CD
t (j) is the con-
sumption of the good produced on odd-numbered islands by creditors with deterministic preferences on
island j.
The second group of creditors has random preferences. It is assumed that creditors on island j with
random preferences want to consume a good produced by debtors on a random island i 6= j−1. In other
words, the second group of creditors wants to consume a good produced by debtors, but the location of
the debtor is random other than the fact that it is never the good produced by debtors on the neighboring






cCRt (j)− f [qCRt (j)]
}
(3)
where qCRt (j) denotes the quantity produced by creditors with random consumption preferences on
island j, and cCRt (j) is the consumption of the good produced on odd-numbered islands by creditors
with random preferences on island j.
All agents can travel to the central location. There is a bank in the central location. In the morning
that bank consumes good q∗ from creditors in the foreign country. In the afternoon, the bank purchases
debt from creditors at a discount and ﬁnances the debt by issuing bank notes. The bank also provides
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settlement for debt at night. The bank ﬁnances consumption through seigniorage and/or the proﬁts
earned by discounting bills.15
All agents on a given island have complete information about the transaction histories of agents on
the neighboring island. In addition, it is assumed that creditors with deterministic preferences always
trade with the same debtor agent at night. Creditors with random preferences always trade with a random
debtor. Each agent in the model can only travel to one other island each subperiod.
There are two assets in the model, bank notes and bills of exchange. Bank notes are perfectly
recognizable, storable, and impossible to counterfeit. It is assumed that bills of exchange can be costlessly
counterfeited, but that both a counterfeit bill and the counterfeiter can be identiﬁed when the bill is
presented to the bank.
The timing of events is as follows.
1. Morning. The home bank consumes goods on the foreign creditor islands and the foreign bank
consumes goods on the home creditor islands. Debtors then travel to their neighboring island to
purchase the good produced by creditors. Debtors are matched with a creditor on the neighboring
island with probability α ∈ (0, 1). Creditors and debtors have information about the past trading
histories of all individuals on the neighboring island. Debtors can use bank notes held from the
previous period to purchase the creditor’s consumption good and/or the creditor can draw a bill of
exchange on the debtor. After consuming, debtors travel back to their respective islands.
2. Afternoon. Creditors can visit the central island to sell bills of exchange to the bank in exchange
for bank notes.
3. Night. Creditors travel to debtor islands to consume. Creditors with deterministic preferences travel
to the same island and meet with the same debtor every period. Creditors with random preferences
travel to diﬀerent islands and trade with debtor agents in a centralized market. Debtors travel to
the central location to repay their debt. The bank settles payments. The period ends.
3.1 The Role of Money and Debt
In the morning debtors travel to their neighboring island to purchase good q using bank notes and/or
debt. Debt comes in the form of a bill of exchange. The bill of exchange is drawn by the creditor and
15The assumption here is akin to a consolidation of ﬁscal and monetary policy.
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accepted by the debtor with a signature. The bill of exchange grants the creditor the right to a real
quantity of goods produced by the debtor at night. As noted above, agents on neighboring islands have
complete information about the transaction history of all the agents on the pair of islands. In addition,
assume that if a debtor defaults on their debt, creditors on neighboring islands will refuse to trade with
that debtor in perpetuity and can credibly commit to this action. The debtor will therefore never have
an incentive to default.
Given that debtors never have an incentive to default, creditors will always lend to debtors in the
morning. A creditor holding a bill of exchange will then have two options. First, the creditor can take
the bill of exchange to the bank on the central location in the afternoon and sell the bill to the bank
at a discount. Second, the creditor can take the bill of exchange to a debtor island and use the bill of
exchange as a medium of exchange to purchase good y at night from a debtor. Thus, it is important to
consider the conditions under which a creditor would choose between these alternatives.
Recall that creditors with deterministic preferences are assumed to be costlessly matched with the
same debtor in every night of every period. Thus, they have an established trading relationship with
debtors. Assume that debtors will refuse to trade with a creditor that passes a counterfeit bill in perpetuity
and can credibly commit to these actions. This implies the following. If a debtor is in an established
relationship with a creditor, they will accept bills of exchange drawn on another debtor in exchange for
goods at night. If the meeting is at random, they will not accept these bills.
This implication can be understood as follows. Since it is costless to counterfeit, every creditor has an
incentive to pass a counterfeit bill of exchange because this allows the creditor to generate consumption
without any additional cost of producing. It was assumed above that once a counterfeit bill is given to
the bank, the counterfeit is discovered and the counterfeiter is made public knowledge. Thus, for those
in established relationships, the debtor can punish the creditor by refusing to trade in all future meetings
if they pass a counterfeit bill. Thus, creditors in established relationships will never have an incentive to
pass a counterfeit bill.
In contrast, creditors with random consumption preferences trade with debtors in a centralized
market. These meetings are assumed to be anonymous. Thus, debtors do not have a punishment
mechanism since they would not be able to identify the counterfeiter in future meetings and therefore
will not accept bills of exchange from any creditor with random preferences.
Thus, creditors with random preferences will never bring bills of exchange for trading at night. They
16
will have to trade using bank notes. Creditors in established relationships will bring bills of exchange to
trade at night if the consumption that they can purchase with bills of exchange exceeds the consumption
that they can purchase with bank notes.
Proposition 1. Deﬁne Rt as the (gross) real rate of interest. If Rt ≥ 1, creditors with deterministic preferences
will always bring bills of exchange to trade at night.
Proof. See the appendix.
3.2 Creditors
In the morning, creditors on island i produce q(i). In the beginning of the morning, the foreign bank
purchases an amount (2/NI)g∗ from each creditor. Subsequently, debtors arrive on the creditor islands
to consume. When debtors arrive, they do not have any goods to trade. Debtors can oﬀer bank notes
to creditors in exchange for the creditor’s production. If the debtor wants to purchase more than would
be possible with bank notes, then the creditor can draw a bill of exchange on the debtor in exchange for
the additional production. Let bDt denote the real value of a bill drawn by creditors with deterministic
preferences and bRt denote the real value of a bill drawn by creditors with random preferences.
In the afternoon, the creditor can bring the bill of exchange received in the morning to the bill broker
on the central island. Denote the (gross) real rate of interest as Rt.16 The bill broker will oﬀer an amount
equal to bDt (j − 1)/Rt to creditors with deterministic preferences and bRt (j − 1)/Rt to creditors with
random preferences. Alternatively, the creditor could skip the visit to the central island and simply bring
the bill of exchange to a debtor at night and try to use it as a medium of exchange. Whether or not the
creditor will visit the central island is determined as follows.
Creditors with deterministic preferences draw bills of exchange such that
bDt (j) = q
CD
t (j)− (2/NI)g∗t − φtmt (4)
where φt is the price of money, mt is the quantity of bank note balances held by a debtor, qCDt (i)
is the quantity produced by creditors with deterministic preferences on island j and g∗ denotes the
consumption by the foreign bank.
16The term gross real interest rate has the following deﬁnition. Suppose that the real interest rate is 5%. The gross real
interest rate is R = 1.05.
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Creditors with random preferences draw bills of exchange such that
bRt (j) = q
CR
t (j)− (2/NI)g∗t − φtmt (5)
where qCRt (j) is the quantity produced by creditors with random preferences on island j.
Creditors who have random consumption preferences bring banknotes into the night subperiod. They
can consume an amount, cCRt , subject to the constraint
φtm
CR
t ≥ cCRt (j) (6)
where mCRt denotes bank note balances held by creditors.
Proposition 2. In any equilibrium in which bank notes are held, constraint (6) will always bind.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In any equilibrium where bank notes are held, it will be true that creditors will never hold more bank
notes than are necessary to carry out transactions at night. It follows that the creditors’ optimization
problem is static.
Proposition 3. The production decision of creditors with deterministic preferences is independent of the rate of
return on money.
Proof. Consumption for creditors with deterministic preferences satisﬁes












cCDt (j)− f [qCDt (j)]
subject to (4) and (7).
This implies that the optimization problem can be re-written as
max
qt
qCDt (j)− f [qCDt (j)]
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The ﬁrst-order condition is given as
1 = f ′[qCDt (j)] (8)
The quantity of production done by creditors with deterministic preferences is independent of the rate
of return on money.
This result can be understood as follows. Since creditors with deterministic preferences can use the
bills of exchange that they draw on debtors as a medium of exchange at night, they will choose to draw a
quantity such that the marginal utility of consumption at night is equal to the marginal cost of production
in the morning. This decision is independent of the price of money because creditors can substitute bills
of exchange one-for-one with bank note balances. Thus, when the real value of bank notes is low, they
can issue a larger quantity of bills of exchange and when the real value of bank notes is high, they can
draw a smaller quantity of bills.
The same is not true for creditors with random preferences. Since creditors with random preferences
meet anonymously with debtors at night, they must use bank notes to trade. Since debtors will not accept
bills of exchange, creditors with random preferences must ﬁrst visit the central location to discount the
bills at the bank. If the (gross) real interest rate charged for discounting bills, Rt, is greater than one,
these creditors cannot substitute bills of exchange one-for-one with bank notes. As such, the decision of
creditors will be a function of the real interest rate.
The quantity of bank notes held by creditors with random preferences is equal to the sum of the
discounted value of the bill of exchange they sold to the bank in the afternoon and the quantity of bank







Using equation (5) and the fact that (6) is binding, it follows that this can be re-written as
cCRt =














φtmt − f [qCRt (j)]
The ﬁrst-order condition is given as
1
Rt
= f ′[qCRt (j)] (9)
3.3 Debtors
Debtors are matched with a creditor with probability α ∈ (0, 1). Debtors will either interact with a
creditor with deterministic preferences or a creditor with random preferences. As noted above, creditors
with deterministic preferences produce a quantity that is independent of the rate of return on money.
Debtors that are matched with this creditor therefore consume this quantity. The analysis that follows is
conﬁned to debtors who are matched with creditors with random preferences.
Debtors come into the period with real bank note balances, φtmt. Debtors can use these bank
note balances to purchase the good produced by creditors. Creditors can also draw bills of exchange
on debtors to ﬁnance additional consumption. A debtor that uses a real quantity of bank notes, φtmt,
to purchase good %CRt receives a surplus from trade of u(%
CR
t ) − φtmt. The total surplus from trade
between the debtor and creditor is given as u(%CRt )− f(%CRt ). It is assumed that debtors and creditors
split the surplus each period such that debtors and creditors get a ﬁxed proportion of the surplus. Let
θ denote the fraction of the surplus that goes to debtors. For a debtor that oﬀers d ≤ m bank notes in
exchange for the creditor’s good, it follows that
u(%CDt )− φtdt = θ
[
u(%CRt )− f(%CRt )
]
(10)
where from (5) it must be true that φtdt = qCRt − bRt . It follows from Proposition 2 that in any monetary
equilibrium, dt = mt.
At night, the debtor produces an amount, yCRt (i). For a debtor that enters the period with real bank
note balances, φtmt, the evolution of money balances of a debtor on island i over the course of the
period is given as
φtmt+1 = φtmt + y
l
t(i) + Tt (11)
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where yl denotes the production of the odd-island good for a creditor of type l ∈ {CR,CD}, Tt is a
lump-sum transfer/tax administered by the bank.
Let Wt(mt) denote the value function of debtors holding mt banknotes in the morning and Vt(mt)
denotes the value function of debtors carrying bank note balances, mt, at night. It follows that the value
function for debtors in the morning can be written as
Wt(mt) = α[u(%
CR
t ) + Vt(mt − dt)] + (1− α)Vt(mt) (12)








Tt + φtmt − φtmt+1
)
+ βEtWt+1(mt+1) (13)




The linearity of Vt implies that (12) can be re-written as
Wt(mt) = α[u(%
CR
t )− φtdt] + Vt(mt)
From (10) and (5) it follows that
Wt(mt) = αθ[u(φtmt)− f(φtmt)] + Vt(mt)
Diﬀerentiating this expression with respect to mt yields
W ′t(mt) = αθφt[u
′(%CRt )− f ′(%CRt )] + φt
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In the morning the bank consumes an amount, gt, of the good q∗. In the afternoon the bank discounts
bills of exchange. The bank’s spending is ﬁnanced using the proﬁts from discounting bills and money
creation. It follows that in equilibrium,
gt = φt(Mt −Mt−1) + (Rt − 1)(NI/4)bRt (16)
where Mt is the aggregate supply of money.
3.5 Market-Clearing Conditions




t (j) = %
CR
t , for all j. In addition, symmetry




t (j) = q
CR
t , for all j, and y
D




t (i) = y
R
t , for all i.
Production by creditors satisﬁes
f ′(qCDt ) = 1
and
f ′(qCRt ) = 1/Rt
Equilibrium in the market for the good produced by creditors requires that the consumption pur-
chased by the foreign government and the debtors must equal total production, such that
%CDt + (2/NI)etg
∗












where variables with an asterisk denote the values for the foreign country.
The supply of debt issued by creditors with random preferences is given as
bRt = q
CR
t − [(1− θ)u(%CRt ) + θf(%CRt )]− (4/NI)gt (20)
The aggregate real supply of money is given as
φtMt = (NI/4)[(1− θ)u(%CRt ) + θf(%CRt )] (21)
Since both countries are assumed to be identical, there is a symmetric set of equilibrium conditions










u′(%CR∗t+1 )− f ′(%CR∗t+1 )
]
+ 1 (23)
%CD∗t + (2/NI)(1/et)gt = 1 (24)
%CR∗t + (2/NI)(1/et)gt = q
CR∗
t (25)
bRt ∗ = qCR∗t − [(1− θ)u(%CR∗t ) + θf(%CR∗t )]− (4/NI)g∗t (26)
φ∗tM
∗
t = (NI/4)[(1− θ)u(%CR∗t ) + θf(%CR∗t )] (27)
Equilibrium. Suppose that:
1. The home money supply follows the process






where mt is an unexpected shock to the money supply, M is the steady state value of the home money
supply, and ρm ∈ (0, 1) and γ are parameters.
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2. Home real bank spending follows the process






where εgt is a shock to spending, g is the steady state level of consumption by the home bank, and
ρg ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter.
3. The foreign money supply follows the process
ln(M∗t ) = ln(M





where m∗t is an unexpected shock to the money supply, M∗ is the steady state value of the foreign money
supply, and ρ∗m ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter
4. Foreign real bank spending follows the process
ln(g∗t ) = (1− ρ∗g) ln(g∗) + ρ∗g ln(g∗t−1) + εg∗t
where εg∗t is a shock to spending, g∗ is the steady state level of consumption by the foreign bank, and
ρ∗g ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter.
Given 1, 2, 3, and 4, equations (15) - (27) are suﬃcient to solve for qCRt , Rt, φt, b
R
t , %
CR, %CDt , q
CR∗
t ,
R∗t , φ∗t , bRt ∗, %CR∗, %CD∗t , et.
4 Discussion
4.1 Consistency with the 19th Century United Kingdom
The model is capable of capturing four key features of the ﬁnancial system in the 19th century U.K.:
• Bills of exchange were the primary form of credit.
• The central bank controlled the money supply through the discounting of bills of exchange.
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• Bills of exchange were often subject to multiple endorsements.17
As noted by Thornton (1802), bills of exchange were often signed by the bill holder and exchanged
in future transactions. Perhaps more remarkable, these bills of exchange traded at par value
(Thornton, 1802 [1807]: 31 - 33). Whether this process was desirable was subject to debate. Some
critics of this process referred to these types of bills of exchange as “ﬁctitious” bills. Critics used
the term “ﬁctitious” since the bill was not backed by goods in process. Nonetheless, Thornton
argues that this distinction is meaningless. This distinction confuses the backing of a bill with the
redemption of a bill. For example, in the event that a bill was not repaid, there was recourse to go
after the borrower. However, the individual or ﬁrm who had drawn the bill did not have the right
to the goods that were to be produced or sold. Thus, reusing the bill did not alter the relationship
between the bill-holder and the acceptor of the bill. Thornton’s point was that bills of exchange
were issued on the creditworthiness of the borrower and not the goods in process. Whereas the
latter might enhance the capacity to repay the debt, the decision to draw a bill was based on the
former.
This characteristic is evident in the model. For example, bills circulate at par in the model because
of established relationships between agents. Since agents have established and recurring relation-
ships, they are willing to accept bills drawn on other agents as payment for production. The
decision to do so is the result of the recurring relationship and the creditworthiness of the agent
reusing the bill. This is true because the lack of a recurring relationship for creditors with random
consumption preferences in the model prevents these agents from reusing bills. Their inability to
reuse the bills is because those selling the goods do not have information about these creditors
own creditworthiness. This characteristic is clearly at the center of Thornton’s (1802 [1807]: 1 -2)
view of bills.
• Bills of exchange were used as repayment for outstanding bills.
In the 19th century United Kingdom, a debtor holding a bill drawn on another debtor could use
this bill as repayment for their own debt. Again, this characteristic is evident in the model. The
fact that bills of exchange are exchanged by some agents at par value implies that some debtors in
17A previous version of the paper referred to bills of exchange as serving a medium-of-exchange role. The author is grateful
to George Selgin for pointing out the diﬀerence.
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the model will sell their production in exchange for a bill drawn on another agent. A debtor who is
matched with a creditor with deterministic preferences at night will receive bills of exchange and/or
bank notes in exchange for production. Since the bank settles debt, these debtors can bring bills
to the bank to repay their debt. To understand this, note the process of settlement in the model.
The bank enters the night holding all of the bills drawn by creditors with random preferences. The
debtors who are matched with creditors with deterministic preferences receive payment in the form
of bills at night. Debtors, however, need to repay their own debt. Since the bank settles payments,
they take the bill to the bank and present it for payment. Thus, every night the bank has the total
quantity of bills issued in the morning. The bank nets out payments to debtors and collects a
proﬁt from the spread between the face value and the discounted value of the bills purchased in
the afternoon.
4.2 Price Level and Exchange Rate Determination
The model can be used to characterize the positions of the Bullionists and the Anti-Bullionists. First,
consider that the Bullionists argued that the depreciation of the exchange rate and the increase in prices
more generally were caused by an excess issuance of currency. Within the model, the price level can be
understood as the inverse of the price of money, pt = 1/φt. The intuition for the Bullionist position can
illustrated by the equilibrium condition for the real supply of money. From equation (21), the price level
can be written as
pt =
Mt
(NI/4)[(1− θ)u(%CRt ) + θf(%CRt )]
As shown, the price level is equal to the ratio of the money supply to money demand. From this condition,
ﬂuctuations in the price level are the result of changes in the supply of money relative to the demand for
money.





[(1− θ)u(%CRt ) + θf(%CRt )]
[(1− θ)u[(%CRt )∗] + θf [(%CRt )∗]]
M∗t
Mt
It follows that, within the model above, an increase in the money supply can have the eﬀects on the
exchange rate and the price level predicted by the Bullionists. However, it is important to note that in
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the model an increase in the money supply will also increase consumption done by debtors who interact
with creditors with random preferences. Thus, the eﬀect of a change in the money supply on the price
level and the exchange rate is at least partially oﬀset by the corresponding increase in money demand.
The Anti-Bullionists argued that government remittances to soldiers ﬁghting abroad, government
payments and subsidies to foreign governments, and poor harvests explained the depreciation in the
exchange rate and the increases in prices. The model treats the consumption by the bank as being
akin to government spending and this spending is only done abroad. In the model, an increase in this
spending can cause depreciation in the exchange rate if it increases consumption in the foreign country.
With regard to this spending, it is important to consider the budget constraint explicitly:
gt = (1/pt)(Mt −Mt−1) + (Rt − 1)(NI/4)bRt
This constraint is of some importance to the debate. For example, while it might be true in a partial
equilibrium context that an increase in government spending and remittances cause the exchange rate
the depreciate, the spending has to be ﬁnanced.
The bank constraint in this model resembles a consolidated government budget constraint. The
choice of this constraint and the relation to a consolidated government budget constraint is a desirable
characteristic given the nature of Bank of England’s credit policies. For example, as Viner (1937: 153)
explains:
The powers of the Bank of England to expand its note issues, moreover, were not conﬁned to
its commercial discount activities. The Bank could also, and did, get its notes into circulation
by advances to the government, by purchases of exchequer bills and public stocks in the open
market, and by advances to investors in new issues of government stocks.
The way in which the Bank of England adjusted note issuances depends on how their policy toward
discounting commercial bills adjusted in response to an increasing demand for credit from the British
government. Modeling the bank’s budget constraint as done in this paper therefore seems desirable.
Silberling (1924a) argues that the Bank of England did an admirable job in its credit policy. He ﬁnds
a negative correlation between commercial discounting and advances to the government. Silberling
concludes that the Bank of England extended credit to the government only when commercial discounting
was low. He then argues that the Bank’s credit policy is not consistent with excess issuance. Viner (1937)
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counters that one could just as easily conclude that the Bank reduces commercial credit when advances
to the government were high. In addition, while this negative correlation is perhaps true looking at the
early years of the Restriction Period, there is a clear positive upward trend in both commercial credit
and advances to the government over the entire Restriction Period.18 Viner (1937: 168) points out that
“the Bank increased both its advances to the government and its commercial discounts substantially”
and “the increase in its commercial discounts was proportionately much greater than the increase in its
advances to the government.” Even if Silberling is correct that government spending was not the driving
force behind an excess issuance, one cannot ignore the substantial increase in bank notes implied by the
extension of commercial credit.
Another point that Silberling ignores is that if the Bank of England exercised restraint in granting
commercial credit, this would have resulted in an increase in the real rate of interest as a result of
crowding out. In the present model, the change in the real interest rate causes a change in the demand
for goods and a corresponding change in the demand for money. These general equilibrium concerns
are absent from Silberling’s assessment and from the writings of the Anti-Bullionists.
The present model considers alternative assumptions about the ﬁnancing of bank spending (which,
given the assumptions of the model, is analogous to government spending during the Restriction Period).
Above, it was assumed that the money supply follows the process:
ln(Mt) = ln(M) + ρm ln(Mt−1) + γ(1− ρm) ln(gt) + mt
Of particular importance is the magnitude of γ. If, for example, γ ≤ 0, then this would correspond to the
case in which the bank exercises restraint in the ﬁnancing of spending. However, if γ > 0, then the bank
monetizes some of the spending. Nonetheless, even in the case in which the money supply is constant,
one must carefully consider the general equilibrium eﬀects of the change in spending. For example,
under the scenario in which the money supply is constant, the increase in spending would cause the real
interest rate to rise as a result of the crowding out of private debt. In this case it is possible that the
private response to higher bank spending has an oﬀsetting eﬀect. In the section below γ is estimated to
determine the bank’s credit policy.
18See Chart 2 and Table 3 in Chapter 3 of Viner (1937).
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5 Empirical Analysis
The existing empirical evidence on the Bullionist Controversy provides little empirical support for the
Bullionist position. In this section, it is argued that the theoretical framework presented above can be
used to evaluate the competing hypotheses. The model is estimated with Bayesian procedures using four
macroeconomic variables.19 The estimated impulse response functions show that shocks to the supply of
bank notes cause a statistically signiﬁcant rise in the price level and a statistically signiﬁcant depreciation
in the exchange rate. In addition, there is evidence that the Bank of England monetized some of the
spending of the British government.
The model is then used to simulate data and conduct Granger causality tests. The evidence suggests
that Granger causality tests would cause a researcher to incorrectly determine that the supply of bank
notes is unimportant. This casts doubt on previous empirical results. Taken together with the results of
the estimated model, these results not only cast doubts on the methods and results of previous research,
but also ﬁnd new evidence in favor of the Bullionist position.
5.1 Data
For the estimation of the model, the vector of observables includes the supply of bank notes, real
government spending, the price level, and the exchange rate. The sample is quarterly from 1797:Q1
- 1821:Q2. The data on bank notes are taken from Silberling (1923b), who obtained them from the
Parliamentary Papers. The price level data comes from Gayer, Rostow, and Schwartz (1953). This index
is a monthly index and it has been converted into quarterly averages. The data on the exchange rate
are taken from Oﬃcer (2000). The exchange rate is measured as Flemish schillings per pound.20 Real
government spending is measured using the same series as Oﬃcer (2000). This series is an improvement
by Oﬃcer (2000) over previous measures. The original source of this data is Silberling (1924), who
calculated government spending as the sum of government expenditure on British armies in Europe
and government remittances, which include subsidies and payments made by the British government to
foreign governments. This series was subsequently updated by Sherwig (1969). Oﬃcer (2000) updates
the Sherwig data and uses linear interpolation to generate a quarterly series.
In previous research, Nachane and Hatekar (1995) use the data in levels to test for unit roots and
19The details of the estimation procedure are in the appendix.
20The original source of this data were weekly data from the Resumption Report (1819) and the Bank Charter Report (1932).
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cointegration. Oﬃcer (2000), like the previous authors, ﬁnds evidence of unit roots, but no evidence of
cointegration. Thus, Oﬃcer uses ﬁrst diﬀerenced data to estimate his models. This paper considers an
alternative hypothesis. While the Bank Restriction Period lasted from 1797 to 1821, the Bank of England
resumed redemptions on its own volition in 1817. As a result, this paper proposes that there may have
been a structural break that occurred in 1817, in which the trend of the price level, the supply of bank
notes, and the exchange rate reversed. To test this hypothesis, the following regression is estimated for
the variables used in this paper:
xt = α+ β1t+ β2(1817 Dummy) + β3(t ∗ 1817 Dummy) + ut
where xt denotes the variable of interest, t denotes time and the 1817 Dummy takes on a value of 1 when
the Bank of England resumed redemption. The residual, ut, is then the de-trended value of the variable.
One can then estimate the following regression:




Estimates of ρ can then be used to examine the unit root hypothesis. The results of the ﬁrst regression
are shown in Table 1. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. In each case, the coeﬃcients on the
trend, the dummy, and the interaction term are each the sign that one would expect and statistically
signiﬁcant.
To determine whether or not these variables have a unit root or whether they are stationary around
a changing trend, the second regression is estimated. The results are shown in Table 2. The results
show the estimated AR(1) coeﬃcient, ρ, and the corresponding t-statistic associated with testing the null
hypothesis that ρ = 1. Given where the assumed structural break occurs in the sample, the critical value
that the t-stat must exceed to reject the null hypothesis is -4.04.21 As shown, the null hypothesis of a unit
root can be rejected for the price level and the supply of bank notes, but not the exchange rate. Thus, in
the empirical analysis that follows, these two variables are expressed in deviations from a changing trend
whereas the exchange rate and real government spending are expressed in ﬁrst diﬀerences.22
21See Perron (1989).
22A similar hypothesis was considered for real government spending for the initial end of military conﬂict and for Napoleon’s
defeat at Waterloo. There is no evidence of a structural break in the trend at these break points.
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5.2 Functional Forms and Prior Distribution
In order to estimate the model two functional forms must be speciﬁed. First, it is assumed that the
functional form of u(q) for debtors is given as u(q) = q1−δ/(1− δ). Second, the disutility cost function
for creditors is given as f(q) = (1/2)q2. Some of the model parameters are ﬁxed prior to estimation.
The discount factor, β, is set at 0.99. The parameters α and θ are set to 0.1 and 0.9, respectively. These
parameters are ﬁxed because they appear as a product in the model and therefore would be diﬃcult to
estimate. In addition, there are restrictions on these parameters that are required to produce a steady
state in which all quantities are positive. Also, the total number of agents NI = 228. This is chosen such
that the steady state real interest rate is approximately equal to 3%.23
The prior distributions of the estimated parameters are shown in Table 3. The parameter δ from the
debtor utility function is assumed to follow a gamma distribution with a mean of 2.0 and a standard
deviation of 0.5. The parameter γ, which measures the response of the bank to changes in spending
follows a uniform distribution on the interval [−2, 2]. The choice of a uniform distribution that is
symmetric around zero is used to ensure the bank’s credit policy is identiﬁed through estimation and
is not determined by a tight prior. The priors for the AR(1) coeﬃcients on the stochastic processes are
assumed to follow a beta distribution with a mean of 0.5. The standard errors of the four shocks in
the model are assumed to follow an inverse gamma distribution with a mean of 0.01. Finally, since the
empirical measure of government spending is an imperfect measure of spending as it is presented in the
model, it is assumed that there is a measurement error. The prior distribution of the measurement error
is shown in the ﬁnal row of Table 3.
5.3 Estimation Results
Table 4 shows the mean, the 10th, and the 90th percentiles of the parameters obtained with the
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. The mean estimate of δ is 1.29. The standard deviation of the pos-
terior distribution of δ is considerably smaller than the prior distribution, which provides evidence that
this parameter is well-identiﬁed. The estimated mean of the parameter that measures the bank’s re-
sponse to changes in spending, γ is 1.98. This estimate suggests that the Bank of England monetized
23This ﬁgure is broadly consistent with interest rate data in the aftermath of the Bank Restriction Period. Data on interest
rates during this period are not available. However, it is broadly reported that nominal interest rates were at the usury limit of
5% for much of the Bank Restriction period. Thus, even calculating ex post real interest rates for this period seems dubious.
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some amount of government spending during this period. Again, the posterior distribution of this pa-
rameter is tight around the mean whereas the prior density was ﬂat thereby providing evidence that the
parameter is well-identiﬁed. This ﬁnding is of particular interest because it is consistent with previous
estimates by Barro (1987). In particular, Barro (1987) found that a 1% increase in temporary military ex-
penditures increased money growth by 1.12% during bank suspension periods. The present model implies
that a 1% increase in the government expenditures causes a 0.1% increase in the level of the money supply.
The magnitude of the estimates are not directly comparable since one is measuring the eﬀect on the
growth rate and the other is measuring the change in the level. In addition, the measure of government
expenditures in this model is more broad than that used by Barro. Also, Barro’s data includes the period
from 1914 - 1918 in his sample as well. Nonetheless, the sign and signiﬁcance are consistent. Finally,
the relationship between the log of the money supply and temporary government spending during the
Restriction Period shown in Barro’s (1987) Figure 6 is qualitatively consistent with the estimates in this
paper.
The estimates of the AR(1) coeﬃcients on the stochastic processes indicate persistence in the supply of
bank notes and real government spending. The estimated shocks to the supply of bank notes are nearly
twice as large as shocks to real government spending. The standard deviation of the measurement error
for real government spending is of considerable magnitude relative to the shocks. This likely reﬂects the
large, temporary variations in the growth rate of real government spending during this period.24
5.4 Impulse Response Functions
Figures 3 and 4 plot the estimated impulse response functions for shocks to the supply of bank notes
and to real government spending, respectively. The thick solid line is the impulse response function
associated with the mean parameter estimates of the posterior distribution. The dashed lines correspond
to the 10 percent and 90 percent posterior intervals. As shown in Figure 3, a shock to the supply of bank
notes causes the price level to rise and the exchange rate to depreciate. Also, it is important to note that
the impulse response function at the 10% posterior interval is above zero for the price level and less than
zero at the 90% posterior interval for the exchange rate. Each of these results provides support for the
Bullionist position.
The consolidated budget constraint motivates intuition for the response of the variables to a shock
24This is evident in the data used in this paper as well as in Figure 3 of Barro (1987: 225).
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to real bank (government) spending shown in Figure 4. As shown, a shock to real bank (government)
spending causes a persistent increase in the supply of bank notes. This increase in the money supply
causes the price level to rise. Thus, real government spending increases by more than the real supply of
money. As a result, bank proﬁts must rise to ﬁnance some of the increased spending and therefore the
real interest rate rises. The increase in the real interest rate creates both an income and a substitution
eﬀect for creditors with random preferences. The higher real interest rate means that for a given amount
of production by creditors, the less consumption they will be able to do at night. This is the substitution
eﬀect. The higher real interest implies that to maintain the same level of consumption, creditors with
random preferences will have to produce more. This is the income eﬀect. Evidently, the substitution eﬀect
initially exceeds the income eﬀect since the quantity produced by creditors with random preferences
immediately declines in response to the shock. Production subsequently rises. This initial decline in
production reduces the demand for real money balances at the same time that the money supply is
increasing. As a result, the home price level rises and the exchange rate depreciates.
The response of the price level to a shock to real government spending appears to be consistent
with the Anti-Bullionists since the price level rises, the exchange rate depreciates, and the quantity
of private debt declines following a shock to real government spending. This is not necessarily the
case. It is important to consider the magnitude of the eﬀects and the mechanisms through which the
shock inﬂuenced the price level and exchange rate. First, it is important to note that the shock to
government spending causes the real interest rate to increase, which has a crowding out eﬀect on private
debt. However, the changes in both the real interest rate and the amount of private debt are small in
magnitude. Also, given that the changes in the real interest rate and the quantity of private debt are in
opposite directions, this suggests from the consolidated budget constraint that a large portion of these
shocks to government spending were being monetized by the bank. This is evident in the large and
persistent eﬀect that shocks to real government spending have on the supply of bank notes. Evidently, the
Bank of England monetized some signiﬁcant fraction of government spending. Thus, at least some of the
increase in the price level and the depreciation of the exchange rate should be attributed to the change
in the supply of bank notes. In fact, to illustrate this, Figure 5 plots the impulse response function of
the price level and the exchange rate from a simulation assuming the parameters are equal to the mean
estimates of the posterior distribution. In addition, the ﬁgure also plots the impulse response functions
from a simulation that assumes that γ is an order of magnitude smaller. As shown, the monetization
33
of real government spending appears to be the driving force behind the eﬀects of the real government
spending on the price level and the exchange rate.
The impulse response functions provide support for the Bullionist position without providing corre-
sponding support for the Anti-Bullionist position. This is in contrast to previous empirical results.
5.5 Granger Causality
Despite the evidence from the estimated model shown above, previous authors have argued that Granger
causality tests support the Anti-Bullionst position with either no evidence or mixed evidence in favor
of the Bullionist position. Thus, an open question is why this paper identiﬁes such strong evidence in
favor of the Bullionist position when previous authors could ﬁnd relatively little support for the Bullionist
position. It is argued below, using simulated data from the model, that Granger causality tests are
uninformative.
Granger causality tests examine the null hypothesis that the lags of a particular variable do not have
an eﬀect on the variable of interest. It is possible that the results of Granger causality tests are sensitive
to the timing of the correlation between the supply of bank notes and the price level. As a method of
comparison, the theoretical model presented above is used to simulate data. The simulation consists of
100,000 time series each for the supply of bank notes, the price level, and real government spending
using the mean of the posterior distribution of parameters shown in Table 4. A trivariate VAR consisting
of each of the three simulated series is estimated for each of the 100,000 simulations.
The ﬁrst panel of Table 5 presents the results of Granger causality tests from a trivariate VAR model
using the same data that was used to estimate the model. The results are printed such that X → Y
corresponds with the null hypothesis that the lags of variable X have no eﬀect on variable Y . The second
column of the table presents the p-value associated with that hypothesis test. As shown, the hypothesis
that lags of the supply of bank notes do not aﬀect the price level cannot be rejected.
Consider the same test using data simulated from the model. The second panel of Table 5 lists the
average p-value for the relevant Granger causality test from 100,000 estimates of the VAR. As shown,
one cannot reject the null hypothesis that bank notes do not aﬀect the price level.
The consistency of the results are important for the following reason. For the simulated data, the true
data generating process is known. In the true data generating process, a shock to the supply of bank notes
causes the price level to rise and the price level remains higher for several quarters thereafter. Relying
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solely on Granger causality tests, one would be led to incorrectly conclude that the supply of bank notes
are unimportant for explaining the price level. If the true data generating process is consistent with that
of the model, the simulation results imply that Granger causality tests would not be useful to determine
whether changes in the supply of bank notes had an eﬀect on the price level. Thus, at most, the evidence
from the simulations suggests that Granger causality tests are not informative. At the very least, the
simulation results explain how the results in this paper can be reconciled with previous research.
6 Conclusion
The Bullionist Controversy represents one of the ﬁrst debates about the determination of the price level
and the exchange rate under a paper money standard. The Bullionists argued, on what would now be
considered quantity theoretic grounds, that the increase in the price level and the depreciation of the
exchange rate were caused by an excess supply of bank notes. In contrast, the Anti-Bullionists argued
that changes in the exchange rate and the price level were due to supply shocks, shocks to the balance of
trade, and shocks to military expenditures.
Despite the signiﬁcance of the debate in the history of economic thought, there is little empirical
evidence that exists using modern time series analysis. The evidence that does exist favors the Anti-
Bullionist position. The purpose of this paper is to use an explicit theoretical model to analyze the
positions of the Bullionists and Anti-Bullionists. The model is estimated using Bayesian procedures.
The estimated results suggest that shocks to the supply of bank notes caused a signiﬁcant increase
in the price level and a signiﬁcant depreciation of the exchange rate and that the Bank of England
monetized some portion of government spending. There is little support for the Anti-Bullionist position.
The evidence supports the Bullionist position.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
A creditor with deterministic preferences can use bills of exchange or bank notes as a medium of exchange
at night. Thus, this proof requires that it be shown that these creditors will never be better oﬀ choosing
bank notes.
First, consider the case in which g∗t = 0. In this case, qt = %t.
When creditors and debtors are matched in the morning the expected surplus from trade that goes









Given that u(q) = q1−δ/(1−δ) and f(q) = (1/2)q2, it follows that q∗ = 1, where q∗ denotes the optimal
quantity of trade.
For creditors that use bills of exchange at night, it is shown in section 3.2 that f ′(qt) = 1. Thus, for
creditors using bills of exchange, qt = q∗t = 1.
































From (16), the bank consumes gt according to
gt = φt(Mt −Mt−1) + (Rt − 1)bRt




[(1− θ)u(qt) + θf(qt)]
[(1− θ)u(qt−1) + θf(qt−1)]
Mt−1
Mt







Thus, for (28) to hold, it must be true that Et−1µt = β and Et−1Rt = 1. Supposing that this is true, (16)







However, this implies that gt < 0, which violates the assumption that gt ≥ 0. Thus, creditors with
deterministic preferences will always be better oﬀ using bills of exchange as a medium of exchange at
night.





A creditor using bills of exchange will produce a quantity qt = 1. In addition, qt = %t + (1/NI)g∗t . It
follows that %t = 1 − (1/NI)g∗t . A creditor using bank notes will produce a quantity qt = 1/Rt. It
follows that %t = 1/Rt − (1/NI)g∗t . Thus, a creditor will prefer to use bills of exchange if
(1−θ)[u(1− (1/NI)g∗t )−f(1− (1/NI)g∗t )] ≥ (1−θ)[u((1/Rt)− (1/NI)g∗t )−f((1/Rt)− (1/NI)g∗t )]
or
u(1− (1/NI)g∗t )− u((1/Rt)− (1/NI)g∗t ) ≥ 1−
1
Rt
For R = 1, this clearly holds with equality. Thus, it needs to be determined whether this holds as R
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increases. Diﬀerentiating the condition above yields
1
R2t




Creditors will therefore choose to carry bills of exchange if
u′[(1/Rt)− (1/NI)g∗]− 1 ≥ 0
Given the functional form, u(q) = q1−δ/(1− δ), and the fact that g∗ = 1 in the steady state, this implies
that
1
(1/Rt − 1/NI)δ − 1 ≥ 0
This will be true for any Rt > 1. Thus, creditors with deterministic preferences will always choose to
hold bills of exchange rather than bank notes.
Proof of Proposition 2
Constraint (6) will be binding if creditors spend all bank notes on consumption at night. Creditors
will spend all of their bank notes at night if the real value of those bank notes in period t is greater
than or equal to the real, discounted expected value of the banks notes in period t + 1. This is true
if φt ≥ Etβφt+1. The proof of Proposition 3 requires proving that this condition always holds in an
equilibrium in which money is held.




φtmt − φtmt+1 + φtmct + blt(j)
)
+ βEtWt+1(mt+1)
The Kuhn-Tucker condition is given as
−φt + βEtW ′t+1(mt+1) ≤ 0
where this condition holds with equality if mt > 0. Consider the case in which mt > 0. Using the
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If φt < βEtφt+1, this implies that the surplus from trade would have be negative, which is inconsistent
with utility maximization and therefore no agent would hold the bank notes. Thus, in any equilibrium in
which bank notes are held it must be true that φt ≥ βφt+1.
Details of the Estimation Procedure
The model presented in Section 4 has a rational expectations solution that can be written as
Yt = ΓSt
St = ΨSt−1 + Θεt
where Yt is a vector of control variables, St is a vector of state variables, and εt is a vector of structural
shocks. Deﬁne Zt = [Y ′t S′t] It follows that one can re-write the system of equations above as
Zt = AZt−1 +Bεt (29)
where A and B are functions of Γ, Ψ, and Θ. Now deﬁne Y as a vector of observable variables. It
follows that the observables can be written as
Yt = C +DZt + ξt (30)
where C is a vector to match the means of the observables, D is a matrix of zeroes and ones to match
the observables to the deﬁnitions in the model, and ξ is a vector of measurement errors. Let Φ denote




L(Yt|Y1, . . . ,Yt−1,Φ)
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The Kalman ﬁlter can be used to compute the likelihood of the model using the state space system given
by equations (29) and (30).
The posterior distribution of the model parameters is then characterized by the Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm. The algorithm can be described as follows. The algorithm begins with an initial parameter
vector Φ1,0. The Kalman ﬁlter is then used to obtain and estimate of L(Yt|Φ1,0). The Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm updates the initial parameter vector according to
Φ1,1 = Φ1,0 + ωψ1
where Φ1,1 is the updated parameter vector, ω is a “jump” scalar, ψ is the Choleski decomposition of the
variance-covariance matrix of Φ1, and 1 is normally distributed.
The updated parameter vector is fed through the Kalman ﬁlter to calculate the likelihood function of
the model. The Metropolis-Hastings decision rule is then used to determine whether to accept the initial
parameter vector or the proposed update. This process is carried out N times and is used to generate a
posterior density, p(Φ|YT ).
Of particular importance for the characterization of the posterior distribution is the choice of the
“jump” scalar ω. This parameter determines the size of the “jump” in the updated parameter vector for
a given . A larger value of ω implies a lower acceptance rate for the algorithm.
For the estimation of the model, a sample of 250,000 draws was created. The ﬁrst 50,000 draws
were discarded. The jump scalar was set to 0.225, which produced an acceptance rate of 32%.
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Figure 1: Price Level, 1797 - 1821. Source: Gayer, Rostow, and Schwartz (1953)
Table 1: Trend Regression Results
Price Level Bank Notes Exchange Rate
Constant 6.47 9.35 -13.80
(0.34) (0.27) (8.04)
Time Trend 0.003 0.01 -0.08
(0.001) (0.0004) (0.01)
1817 Dummy -11.28 -9.14 165.26
(2.93) (0.50) (69.86)
(Time Trend * 1817 Dummy) -0.02 -0.02 0.28
(0.005) (0.001) (0.12)
Table 2: Unit Root Regression Results
Price Level Bank Notes Exchange Rate
ρ 0.83 0.83 0.88
(-4.25) (-4.25) (-2.67)
t-stats are in parentheses
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Figure 2: Model Setup
Table 3: Prior Distribution of the Parameters
Parameter Distribution Mean Standard Deviation
δ Gamma 2.00 0.50
γ Uniform 0.00 1.15
ρm Beta 0.50 0.10
ρg Beta 0.50 0.10
ρem Beta 0.50 0.10
ρeg Beta 0.50 0.10
ρ∗m Beta 0.50 0.20
ρ∗g Beta 0.50 0.20
σεm Inverse Gamma 0.01 Inf
σεg Inverse Gamma 0.01 Inf
σεm∗ Inverse Gamma 0.01 Inf
σεg∗ Inverse Gamma 0.01 Inf
σg Uniform 2.50 1.44
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Table 4: Posterior Distribution of the Parameters
Parameter Posterior Mean 10th percentile 90th percentile
δ 1.292 1.288 1.297
γ 1.98 1.96 2.00
ρm 0.95 0.946 0.953
ρg 0.952 0.951 0.953
ρem 0.67 0.65 0.69
ρeg 0.952 0.952 0.953
ρ∗m 0.993 0.989 0.998
ρ∗g 0.64 0.60 0.66
σεm 0.055 0.050 0.060
σεg 0.029 0.025 0.033
σεm∗ 0.255 0.192 0.312
σεg∗ 0.010 0.002 0.018
σg 0.59 0.51 0.66
Table 5: Granger Causality Tests
Granger causality p-value
British Data
Bank Notes → Price Level 0.44
Simulated Data, γ = 1.98









































































































































Figure 4: Estimated Impulse Response Functions: Shock to Real Bank (Government) Spending
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Figure 5: Simulated Impulse Response Functions: Shock to Real Bank (Government) Spending Under
Diﬀerent Assumptions About Monetization
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